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Disclaimer: for ease of reference and in the interest of efficiency, judgments, decisions, legislation, 
soft law and literature are quoted in this order, in abbreviated terms, and by means of example 
throughout the document. A complete list of the relvant supporting information, documents and 
respective sources (where applicable) is provided at the end of this paper. Unless otherwise resulting 
from the context, indications to items in judgments and decisions shall refer to the respective 
paragraphs and, in the case of bibliography, to the applicable pages. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The way the EU built its practice to place liability on parent companies for the wrongs of 
present and former subsidiaries in competition infringements is one of the most controversial 
subjects in this field of law.  
 
Almost all decisions addressed to parent companies i  this area inevitably end up being 
challenged in Court. Traders have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the underlying goals 
of this policy, as it stretches the gap between law and economic realm to the limit. Some of 
the arguments discussed today before the EU judicature are the exact same put forward 40 
years in the past. Authors and practitioners fiercely turn against the rationale of the doctrine 
and constantly seek for exemptions to break out of the seemingly inevitable grid of group 
liability.  
 
For years, parental liability was suspected of breaching some of the most fundamental 
principles of EU law, v.g. presumption of innocence,1 legality of offences and penalties,2 non-
discrimination,3 proportionality,4 rights of defence,5 equality of arms,6 sound administration,7 
and autonomy of legal persons.8 
 
Yet, the EC managed to succeed against these contenti s without any support from the EU 
legislature. This is an area which took the EC and the Court time and resilience to build in the 
name of effective deterrence in the fight against atitrust offences. 
 
                                                 
1 GC Otis 71-3, 76; 2011 ThyssenKrupp 112-7; CJ 2011 Elf Aquitaine 59. 
2 1991 Anic 145; CJ Akzo 71, 77; CJ General Química 52; 2011 Schindler 94-115; 2012 AOI 62-3; 2012 Shell 
54. 
3 2005 Tokai 397; CJ Otis 53; 13.9.2012 Total & Elf Aquitaine 68-72. 
4 Areva 348-51; 13.9.2012 Total & Elf Aquitaine 80. 
5 CJ ARBED 19-24; 2005 Tokai 140-1; 2006 Avebe 49; 9.9.2011 AOI 178-88. 
6 GC 2011 Elf Aquitaine 155-9. 
7 GC 2011 Elf Aquitaine 237-41, 262-3; 2011 Team Relocations 169-70. 
8 2009 Arkema 100; 2009 Elf Aquitaine 125. 
 6
The flip side of the coin is that parental liability bears wide-reaching costs for undertakings. 
In the short term it renders parents liable for the infringements of their daughters, allows the 
10% fine cap to encompass the turnover of the whole group, triggers aggravating 
circumstances in respect of the entire group leading to a substantial uptake in the fines, 
submits the whole undertaking to investigative and i trusive measures and may render it 
liable in foreign jurisdictions. In the long run, attaching an infringing record to the 
undertaking concerned raises, along with reputationl harm, the risk of exposure to private 
damages actions.  
 
We intend to give this subject a pragmatic spin, examining and clarifying its main principles 
and rules, which are based on copious case laws and pr ctices, and hopefully shed some light 
on its strengths and weaknesses.  
 
2. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
 
This paper concerns the accountability of parent companies for infringements committed by 
their subsidiaries against the background of proceedings relating to Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.  
 
Although this work is focused on parental liability under EU competition law, the lessons 
learnt from it are largely applicable to cases conducted by national agencies as well. Indeed, 
subsequent to Regulation 1/2003, national authorities and courts are bound to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU whenever applying their competition laws to collusive and unilateral 
anticompetitive behaviours that may affect trade betwe n Member States. 
 
Given that in the present state of integration of EU markets a significant part of competition 
infringements are likely to affect trade between Memb r States to an appreciable extent,9 this 
                                                 
9 EC Guidelines on the effect on trade 19-57. 
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means investigations carried out by national authorities will often trigger EU law, alone or 
concomitantly with national law. 
 
This has also happened where national agencies sought to impute liability to parent 
companies for competition breaches perpetrated by their subsidiaries. In Portugal, for 
instance, the PCA envisaged tackling this doctrine at least three times, but Portuguese courts 
have not yet ruled on the substance of the issue.10    
 
Along with Portugal, other jurisdictions have relied on parental liability rules designed by the 
EU when handling, at the national level, infringements caught by Articles 101 and 102. The 
Italian competition authority has done it,11 as well as the OFT in the United Kingdom, 
endorsed by the country’s CAT.12 English courts have also appraised claims in civildamages 
actions against parents involved in EU cartels.13 Likewise, the CJ has already dealt with 
questions referred for preliminary rulings, relating to the interpretation and application of this 
doctrine in national proceedings.14 
 
Reference to these cases serves the purpose of illustrating that the importance of the rules on 
shared parental liability extends greatly beyond Brussels and Luxembourg’s working rooms. 
The more so as the law stemming from EU Treaties and institutions has primacy over the law 
of the Member States.15  
 
                                                 
10 2006 Vatel et al., where the PCA held a subsidiary liable for the conduct of its parent company, so this case 
cannot be treated on the same footing as those involv g parental liability (partially annulled by LCC and LCA’s 
judgments of 2007); 2009 PT / ZON involving a problem of liability succession (LCC stated in 2011 judgment 
that the proceedings reached the statute of limitation and the PCA’s power to impose a fine was time-barred); 
2009 Eurest et al. (quashed by the LCC in 2010 Sodexo et al. on procedural grounds). 
11 2000 RC Auto 42, fn 4; 2003 Tabacchi 209-14. 
12 2007 Double Quick 46, 65-80. 2002 Suretrack 18, in 2012 Ezrachi 23.  
13 2003 Provimi; 2008 Emerson; 2010 Cooper Tire; 2011 Toshiba. 
14 ETI. 
15 1964 Costa / ENEL pp. 593-4; Declaration 17 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty; Article 8(4) of the Portuguese 
Constitution. 
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Given the latitude of the ‘effect on trade’ jurisdictional threshold, EU rules on parental 
liability are a leverage national agencies and courts may avail themselves of in most of their 
antitrust investigations.  
  
It falls outside the scope of the present work to assess the application and impact of this 
doctrine at the national level, either on the contrast between EU and national law16 or on the 
few (if not theoretical) cases where it might bring about purely internal disputes. 
 
3. CONCEPT OF UNDERTAKING  
 
The starting point of the discussion lies on the notion of undertaking. The term is defined 
nowhere in the treaties, but it was soon realised that i  would have to be one of a functional 
and specific nature17 and that, in matters of competition, business reality is more important 
than legal form, thus blurring the distinction betwen undertakings, companies and 
individuals.18  
 
Essentially, an undertaking refers to any entity engaged in a commercial activity, i.e. an 
economic unity consisting of a unitary organisation f personal, tangible and intangible 
elements which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and capable of 
contributing inter alia to the commission of an infringement.19 The legal status and the way in 
which it is financed are irrelevant, even if in law n economic unit consists of several persons, 
natural or legal.20 The idea is that formal separation between companies, resulting from their 
distinct personality, cannot outweigh the unity of their conduct on the market.21  
 
The first reported time where EU institutions took note of the particular situation of groups of 
companies was in 1969 when the EC exempted from the application of Article 85 TEC (now 
                                                 
16 Oliveira & Ferro 64 et seq.  
17 2012 Elf Aquitaine 23; 13.9.2012 Total & Elf Aquitaine 23. Cartonboard 140. 
18 1972 ICI p. 632. 
19 1992 Shell 311; GC 2007 Akzo 57; EI du Pont 58; 2012 Dow 73. 
20 GC DaimlerChrysler 85; CJ Akzo 54-5; 2011 AG2R 41. 
21 ICI 140; 1972 Geigy 45; 1972 Sandoz 45. 
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Article 101 TFEU) an agreement between a parent and a subsidiary on the grounds that the 
two were not competing with each other, rather the subsidiary was an integral part of the 
business entity under the control of the parent.22 
 
Consequently, the importance of economic unities waat the outset identified in the context 
of in house relationships. However, if in this context the existence of a group relationship had 
a positive outcome for undertakings, in that it ruled out the application of Article 101 TFEU 
or corresponding previous articles23 – known as ‘group privilege’ –, unfavourable 
consequences soon followed.   
 
4. MAIN PRINCIPLES AND RULES GOVERNING PARENTAL LIABILITY  
 
The earliest appearance of the doctrine in the EU can be traced back to the 1970s in the 
landmark ‘Dyestuffs cases’. In assessing liability for an infringement of current Article 101,24 
the Court held that the fact that a subsidiary has a separate legal personality is not sufficient to 
exclude imputing its conduct to the parent company if it “ does not decide independently upon 
its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given 
to it by the parent company.” 25  
 
This statement echoed on numerous subsequent cases26 nd was gradually fine-tuned. 
 
4.1 Rationale of the doctrine 
 
Assigning to a company liability for the conduct of another is something that is not specific to 
parent-subsidiary relationships. Suffice it to observe that where it turns out an undertaking has 
                                                 
22 1969 Christiani & Nielsen. 
23 ICI 134; 15/74 Centrafarm 41; 16/74 Centrafarm 32; 1989 Ahmed Saeed 35; 1992 SIV 357. 2008 Bellamy & 
Child 103; Oliveira & Ferro 78-9. 
24 This is also valid in respect to Article 102 TFEU: 1984 Hydrotherm 11; CJ Viho 17; 2003 Michelin 290; 2009 
Clearstream 198. 
25 ICI 132-5; Geigy 44; Sandoz 44. 
26 1973 Continental Can 15; 1983 AEG 49; CJ Aristrain 96; CJ Akzo 58; CJ 2011 ArcelorMittal 96; CJ 2011 Elf 
Aquitaine 54; 2012 Dow 74. 2004 Copper Plumbing Tubes 543; 2006 Methacrylates 246-7.  
 10
followed the directions issued to it by another, the anticompetitive conduct of the former can 
be imputed to the latter.27  
 
Therefore, Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 is interpreted as meaning that an undertaking may 
be declared liable with another for a wrongdoing provided that it is demonstrated that the 
infringement could also be found to have been committed by the first undertaking.28  
 
In group relationships, things are a bit different.  
 
Evidently, the anticompetitive conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to its parent if there is 
specific evidence implicating the parent in the subsidiary’s actions.29 The EC is also keen to 
make parents liable if they were or should have been aware of the infringing behaviour of 
their daughters.30 
 
In a scenario where a parent company is liable with its subsidiary by a breach materially 
committed by the second, and even if the parent is ot directly involved in the infraction, still 
the parent itself is deemed to have committed an individual infringement just on account of 
the fact that the two constitute a single group.31 This ‘collective personal responsibility’ is one 
of the reasons why parental liability is considered to be compatible with the general principle 
of individual liability.32  
 
What is more, the Court went so far as to consider that the bond of economic dependence 
existing between a parent and a subsidiary does not preclude a divergence in conduct or in 
                                                 
27 1975 Suiker Unie 538-40; 2002 HFB 527; 2012 Shell 37. 
28 1998 Metsä-Serla 42-3; HFB 527. 
29 CJ KNP 73; GC Otis 104. 2007 Sorinas 495-6. 
30 Sorinas 497. 
31 2000 Metsä-Serla 28, 34; 2012 Dow 176. 2010 Wenner & Barlingen 26; 2011 Olaerts & Cauffman 433; 
Joshua et al. 5. 
32 Fn 2.  
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interests between the two that would prevent the conduct of the latter from being ascribed to 
them both.33  
 
In any event, the particular reasoning behind parent l liability is that it is not because the 
parent instigated its subsidiary to commit the infringement or because the parent participated 
in the infringement, or even because it was aware of it, but merely because the two form a 
single undertaking that a parent may be held liable with a subsidiary for an infraction to EU 
competition rules and a fine thereof.34 
 
In a nutshell, the cognitive iter routinely followed by the Court with regard to the rationale of 
liability of a parent company for the conduct alleged against its subsidiary is the following.35 
 
The Court observes that formal separation of two companies resulting from their having 
distinct legal identity is not decisive. The criteron is whether or not there is some form of 
unity in their conduct on the market. Accordingly, so the argument goes, it may prove 
necessary to establish whether two companies fall within one and the same undertaking. 
 
As regards the question whether a person who is not the perpetrator of the infringement may 
nonetheless be penalised, it is apparent, following o  from the points just made, that the 
conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to its parent in particular where the subsidiary does 
not decide independently upon its own conduct on the market, but follows instructions given 
to it by the parent. 
 
In such a situation, the parent and the subsidiary form a single undertaking and this enables 
competition authorities to address a decision imposing fines to the parent company without 
having to establish its personal involvement in the infringement.  
 
                                                 
33 1979 BMW 24. Montesa & Givaja 567-8. 
34 CJ Akzo 59; CJ 2011 Elf Aquitaine 88; 13.9.2012 Total & Elf Aquitaine 31. 2006 Hydrogen Peroxide 441. 
35 CJ General Química 34-8; FLSmidth 30; 2012 AOI 42-4. 
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4.2 Attribution of liability 
 
Unlike merger control, where all it takes to establish group relationships is “the possibility” of 
exercising decisive influence on a company,36 in parental liability a further cross-check needs 
to be carried out.37   
 
In order to be able to impute the conduct of a subsidiary to a parent company under EU law, 
competition authorities cannot merely find that a parent is in a position to exercise decisive 
influence over its subsidiary but must also demonstrate that such influence was actually 
exercised.38 
  
Parental liability cannot be set up on the sole basis of the parent company’s ability to exert 
influence on the subsidiary. This first step is actu lly similar to the review applied in merger 
control.39 This fact alone, however, cannot be overestimated for antitrust purposes and must 
be interpreted with care in this context. It needs merely be pointed out that that first step is not 
enough for imputing liability to a parent in EU antitrust law, imputation being always 
dependent on a finding that decisive influence was actually exercised. 
 
This approach makes perfect sense for us. Assessing control in order to determine jurisdiction 
in a merger case has nothing at all to do with imposing responsibility and heavy sanctions on 
a company. Other EU competition rules, v.g. on State aid 40 have no bearing on the conditions 
for striking liability for an antitrust infringement to a parent company. 
 
In short, in order for the acts of a subsidiary to be attributed to its parent there must be (i) a 
power to direct the subsidiary and (ii)  the actual exercise of control to such an extent that the 
                                                 
36 Article 3(2) ECMR; Article 36(3) of the Portuguese competition act. 
37 Criticising this double standard: 2000 Wils 106-7; Montesa & Givaja 564; Oliveira & Ferro 78-9.  
38 ICI 137; AEG 50; Team Relocations 147; 2012 Dow 75. 
39 2010 AOI 88-9, 198-200; Team Relocations 148; fn 36. 
40 GC 2011 Elf Aquitaine 61. 
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subsidiary does not determine its behaviour on the market autonomously.41 Normally, the 
Court skips the first limb and often concentrates simply on the second, because fulfilment of 
the last condition automatically entails satisfaction of the former.42 
 
It follows that the primary question to be resolved in a parental liability situation is whether 
the parent actually exercised decisive influence ovr the subsidiary. As a rule, it is for 
competition agencies to demonstrate such exercise.43 Typically, that is made by one of three 
means (or a combination of any): a presumption, factual indicia or a ‘dual basis’ approach. 
 




When a company is in condition to exert a decisive influence on a subsidiary, consideration 
must still be given to the question whether it actully made use of that power. “However, such 
a check appears superfluous in the case of (…) a wholly owned subsidiary, [which] 
necessarily follows a policy laid down by the [parent].”44 
 
It was with this sentence, issued as long ago as 1983, that the Court laid the path for a legal 
presumption according to which, in the particular cse of a parent company holding 100% of 
a subsidiary, it is presumed that they constitute on and the same undertaking and that the 
parent in fact exercises decisive influence over th subsidiary. 
 
Whether or not the AEG Court should claim authorship for the creation of the presumption is 
at the very least questionable. 
 
                                                 
41 1974 Commercial Solvents p. 228; GC Otis 69. 
42 2010 AOI 166-7. Against, Oliveira & Ferro 58. 
43 Avebe 136; CJ Otis 43. 
44 AEG 50. 
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Already in 1969, when the EC exempted an intra-group agreement between a parent and a 
subsidiary, it did so on grounds that it would not be possible for a wholly owned subsidiary to 
act autonomously from its sole stakeholder.45 In 1972 the EC kept pushing for some kind of 
presumption by taking the view in ICI that the fact that a subsidiary is controlled by the parent 
company “means that it automatically obeys instructions from the parent company.” 46 Even 
the Court established in ICI an interesting presumption that, based on a pattern of influence by 
a parent over its subsidiary and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed 
that on later occasions the same behaviour was adopte .47 In Commercial Solvents the EC 
acted no differently and sustained that the fact tha one company holds a majority of the 
voting stock of another lends support to the presumption that it controls the latter.48  
 
Despite the importance, especially after AEG, of the liability presumption, its practical range 
was far from straightforward for many years. There were serious doubts as to whether it was 
self-sufficient, which would have the consequence that parental liability would be properly 
established in full ownership situations, or if it was only a supporting argument that would 
still require compelling evidence that decisive influence was exercised by the parent.  
 
It is only fair to say that it was not until 2007 in Akzo (upheld by the CJ) that this dual vision 
was brought to a close.  
 
In some of its initial decisions, the EC did not make use of the presumption at all, and held a 
parent answerable for an infringement only where there was evidence implicating it in the 
conduct of a subsidiary.49  
 
At a later stage, broadly set at 2002 / 2003, there was a shift in the EC’s policy on parental 
liability.50 From that period onwards, the EC acknowledged the presumption more seriously, 
                                                 
45 Fn 22. 
46 P. 632. 
47 139. 
48 P. 230. 
49 1992 Shell 315; 1998 Metsä-Serla 58-9. 1986 Polypropylene 96-102; Cartonboard 143; 2001 Vitamins 642; 
2002 Austrian banks 479. 
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but went about further strengthening that assumption by adducing corroborating facts.51 Those 
facts should show either that the parent was involved in the infringement, or that it was aware 
of it, or that as a minimum the parent actually intervened in the commercial policy of the 
infringing subsidiary.52 This meant that if there was nothing to underpin any of these 
conclusions on the facts, the EC would abstain from holding shareholders liable for their 
subsidiaries’ infringements.  
 
By then, the EC feared the presumption would not be sufficient per se to support parental 
liability in total ownership scenarios.53 It was only after 2004 that it relied in full on the 
presumption.54 
 
We have to recognise that the EC’s cautiousness was somehow induced by the Court’s 
reluctance over many years to take a clear standing on the probative value of such a 
presumption, or, worse, by the Court’s confusing arguments. 
 
After the AEG judgment was delivered, it took the Court a long time to assimilate the 
presumption. The first serious attempt to bring it back was 10 years later at the hands of a 
newly created CFI in BPB.55 This judgment was challenged before the CJ, which, in appeal, 
simply abstained from ruling on the subject and limited itself to adhere to the AG’s Opinion 
on the issue.56 In the Opinion, AG Léger seemed to flag the message that the AEG 
presumption should be avoided and even qualified it as “superfluous” if  specific findings of 
fact are made to establish decisive influence.57  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
50 CJ 2011 Elf Aquitaine 143, 164. 
51 2004 Tobacco Spain 372. 
52 Copper Plumbing 562; 2005 MCAA 226-7, 245. 
53 2010 AOI 118, 147. 
54 MCAA 258; 2008 Candle waxes 574. 
55 GC 1993 BPB 149. 
56 CJ 1995 BPB 11. 
57 1994 BPB 29. 
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Whilst the AEG Court rendered superfluous to examine if a company exerts decisive 
influence over a fully owned subsidiary, in BPB the Court played the argument backwards 
and deemed the presumption to be superfluous.  
 
This being the mind set, it came as no surprise that at the first opportunity the GC ‘redeemed’ 
itself and, without setting aside the presumption, diminished it in a meaningful way. Stora 
was the judgment that triggered the alarms and went famous because of that. In this case the 
GC made a parent liable for the conduct of a 100% subsidiary, not on account of the 
presumption but because it failed to demonstrate the subsidiary’s autonomy.58  
 
Subsequent to Stora, many hours were devoted to determine what exactly the implications of 
that judgment should be for the soundness of a presumption such as this weighing on parent 
companies. It so happens that the first result of that struggle came swiftly in 2000 in the Stora 
appeal and did not bring along good news for the EC. 
 
History repeated itself; as in BPB, the most sceptical role was once again taken by the AG. In 
its Opinion, AG Mischo expressed the view that the GC implicitly accepted that a 100% 
shareholding does not definitively decide the imputability issue and suggested that, although 
the burden of proving that a parent exercised decisive nfluence over a subsidiary is eased in 
the case of 100% control, “[s]omething more than the extent of the shareholding must be 
shown, but it may be in the form of indicia.”59 
 
This time the CJ did not go as far as the advice of the AG,60 yet confirmed that the GC did not 
hold that a 100% shareholding in itself sufficed for a finding that the parent was responsible.61 
 
                                                 
58 GC 1998 Stora 80. 
59 Opinion CJ 2000 Stora 47-8. 
60 Disagreeing, 2007 Briggs & Jordan 18; 2011 La Rocca 69. 
61 CJ Stora 28. 
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This approach was perceived as meaning that when all sh reholding in the subsidiary is held 
by a single company that circumstance is not, alone a d in itself, sufficient to inflict 
liability.62  
 
In 2007, the GC appeared to misconceive the purpose of the presumption, confusing the 
concept of control with that of exercise of control, when it was plain since 1983 that only the 
latter could be presumed. This misunderstanding arose in two cases, where the GC declared 
essentially that, although the evidence relating to a 100% shareholding provides a strong 
indication that the parent “is able” to exercise decisive influence over a subsidiary, this is not 
enough to attribute liability to the parent.63 In Jungbunzlauer, the Court stood on the same 
puzzling path.64  
 
Finally, in late 2007 the Akzo Court reshaped the presumption to what it is in the current state 
of affairs: a self-fulfilling support to the exercise of decisive influence in full ownership cases. 
It is true that between AEG and Akzo, other judgments strove to keep the presumption alive,65 
but none of them risked doing what was missing: uneq ivocally stressing that “it is sufficient 
(…) to show that the entire capital of a subsidiary is held by the parent company in order to 
conclude that the parent company exercises decisive influence over its commercial policy.” 66  
 
The Akzo Court succeeded in establishing the sufficiency of the presumption for the purposes 
of supporting, on its own, parental liability in total ownership situations. However, it failed to 
shed much needed light on past case law. It focused only on Stora to hold that the AEG 
principle was not amended by that ruling,67 but by ignoring the evolution of case law after 
Stora, the Court assumed a new stance that can easily be said to run counter to the previous 
one.  
 
                                                 
62 La Rocca 70. 
63 DaimlerChrysler 218-9; 2007 Bolloré 132. 
64 2006 Jungbunzlauer 120. 
65 1999 PVC II 961, 984; 2005 Tokai 60-2; 2007 Prym 146.  
66 CJ Akzo 61. 
67 CJ Akzo 62. 
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In any case, the fact remains that after Akzo, as a result of an abundant body of case law, it 
became clear that in the specific case of a company holding 100% of a subsidiary, the parent 
can exercise a decisive influence over the subsidiary and there is a rebuttable presumption that 
it does so.  
 
As a result, it is sufficient for agencies wishing to make a parent liable to show that it holds 
the entire capital of a subsidiary, without the need to offer convincing evidence establishing 
decisive influence or any other liaison between the parent and the subsidiary’s infringement. 




In Commercial Solvents the EC took the opinion that, whilst it was impossible for a wholly 
owned subsidiary to act autonomously from its parent, this did not mean that any subsidiary in 
which the parent holds less than 100% of the capital is utonomous.69 This readily suggested 
how the EC was willing to address situations where almost all of a company is owned by 
another. 
 
Just that way, the EC held a 98% shareholding to be sufficient in itself to impute liability to a 
parent company solely on the basis of the presumption,70 which was later upheld by the 
Court.71 A similar conclusion was reached where subsidiaries were owned, directly or 
indirectly, approximately 92%,72 96%,73 97%74 or 99%.75 
 
                                                 
68 2008 Ortiz Blanco et al. 8; 2010 Riesenkampff & Krauthausen 41; La Rocca 73-4; 2012 Joshua et al. 5.  
69 Commercial Solvents p. 231; 2010 Knauf Gips 82; CJ Otis 43. 
70 MCAA 258; Hydrogen Peroxide 427.  
71 2009 Elf Aquitaine 155-6; 2011 Arkema 42. 
72 2011 Gosselin 2, 52-3. 
73 7.6.2011 Total & Elf Aquitaine 2, 53-6; 14.7.2011 Total & Elf Aquitaine 2, 51-2. 
74 2011 Arkema France et al. 2, 51-3. 2008 Sodium chlorate 396. 
75 Michelin 290; 14.7.2011 Total & Elf Aquitaine 2, 51-2.  
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The reasoning for this has been that these subsidiaries, similarly to fully owned companies, do 
not determine their conduct on the market independently, thereby warranting a finding of joint 
and several liability on the major shareholder.76  
 
The presumption in the case of 100% ownership stems from the fact that a company in this 
position will almost always exercise decisive influence over its subsidiary, and therefore 
nothing different should be assumed in cases of next to 100% ownership given that the 
remaining shareholders, due to their de minimis position, will typically have no special 
minority rights but only a financial interest in the business of the subsidiary.77 
 
All in all, EU case law as it stands considers quasi-ownership shareholdings to be assimilated 
to full ownership for the purposes of the presumption. 
 
Underneath the radar 
 
There is no magical shareholding figure which may a priori settle where we should draw the 
line between the application and the exclusion of the presumption.  
 
Having assumed this, we have never seen the presumption being employed for shareholdings 
below 90% of the capital of a company.  
 
Reference should also be made to both case law and the EC’s decision practice, which seem 
to suggest that the presumption cannot be relied upon, e.g. when a company holds 90%78 or 
87%79 of another. Lower percentages, such as 65.5%,80 60%,81 57%82 or something ranging 
                                                 
76 Michelin 290; 2011 Álvarez 35. 
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between 41%-52%,83 are also outside the scope of the presumption.84 Minority holdings such 
as 25% are far short of a majority interest and unable per se to confer decisive influence.85 
 
It should, however, be borne in mind that this conclusion only has the effect of hampering the 
use of the presumption; it does not prevent the parnt f om being liable for the infringement 
of a subsidiary if both are deemed to constitute a de facto group on the basis of concrete 
evidence of decisive influence. 
 
This is one of the aspects in which the antitrust doctrine of parental liability most departs from 
merger proceedings. Here, sometimes even a minority stake may amount to control and cause 
two companies to be regarded as an undertaking for all intents and purposes. Conversely, 
shareholdings below substantially high thresholds are unable to substantiate parental liability, 




There have been in our opinion some misleading discussions around the possible extension of 
the liability presumption to joint ventures. The problem concerns again the distinction 
between control and exercise of control.  
 
If a company is jointly held by two or more shareholders, this in no way precludes the 
possibility of those shareholders exercising decisive influence over the conduct of their 
common subsidiary. It is irrelevant, in this regard, whether the nature of control is sole or 
joint and whether that level of influence is enjoyed by virtue of positive or negative powers.86  
 
However, this only indicates that it might make sense to assess parental liability in respect to 
joint ventures, it does not implicate any finding of liability because that also requires meeting 
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the condition pertaining to the actual exercise of c ntrol. The Court pointed out that if that 
condition is satisfied on a joint control case, it will be possible to regard the various 
controlling parents liable for the conduct of their subsidiary.87 But this is not what really 
matters here. The relevant question is whether the presumption, which replaces the need for 
attesting decisive influence, applies to joint ventures. 
 
In the Avebe judgment, the Court appeared to answer affirmatively to this.88 We believe that 
in this ruling the Court conflated the concept of cntrol with that of exercise of control. A 
general possibility of mere control by the parents may definitely arise in the case of a j intly-
owned subsidiary, but that does not detract from the further need to demonstrate that one or 
more parents actually exerted decisive influence ovr that subsidiary. The opposite claim 
appears flawed considering the wording of the judgment and of the contested decision 
themselves.89  
 
In many other cases of joint control, the Court andthe EC recognised that, in the absence of 
evidence implicating parents in infringements of their subsidiaries or at least in their conducts, 
they would have to assume that none of them exercised decisive influence on the latter.90  
 
The presumption of parental liability might make sen  in view of the obvious power that a 
single (or greatly majority) shareholder has in such a situation, and that no one else holds. 
However, this may not be the case with joint ventures, where power may be dispersed and 
consequently weakened.  
 
This is why there is nothing preventing one of the joint stakeholders to be liable for the 
infringement if it is demonstrated that – even in a situation of joint control – that shareholder 
alone exercises decisive influence over the joint company for antitrust purposes,91 even if the 
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proportion of the subsidiary’s capital owned by theparent concerned is smaller than that 
owned by the other parent.92  
 
It is thus not possible to make a judgment of effectiv  exercise of control purely by looking at 
the shareholding structure of a joint venture. Joint ventures are necessarily the result of a 
combination of two or several different groups, which s at odds with the intuitive notion of 
individual undertaking. One of the principles behind the concept of undertaking is that a 
parent and a subsidiary should not compete with each other.93 This does not necessarily 
happen with a joint venture, especially if it is full-f nction.  
 
It is true that the autonomy of full-function joint ventures does not imply that they are under 
no influence of their parents within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.94 However, 
“[t] he full-function nature of a joint venture simply makes the joint venture similar to a 
normal subsidiary having a separate legal personality.”95 The EC itself acknowledges that 
the fundamentals of parental liability point to oppsite directions in the case of fully owned 
subsidiaries or joint ventures.96  
 
Simply put, we believe the Avebe case should not be interpreted as allowing the use of the 
parental liability presumption in regard to joint ventures. In other words, the fact that two or 
more companies hold control over a subsidiary that has breached EU competition law does 
not preclude one or several parents from being liable for that infringement, provided that it is 
established that the parent(s) concerned exercised decisive influence over the joint venture.97 
Even in 75/2598 and 70/3099 joint ventures parents can be made liable for the conduct of their 
subsidiaries.  
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Consequences tied to the presumption 
 
Liability presumption is a means of proof that is available to competition agencies and the EC 
in particular. They are able, but under no obligation, to impute responsibility for a company’s 
infringement to its parent.100 It follows from case law that they are not even obliged to verify 
whether the conditions for parental liability are mt.101 The idea is that it would be seriously 
detrimental to antitrust enforcement if authorities were always required to ascertain who the 
owner of a company is and were allowed to impose a sanction only or always on that 
owner.102 
 
The Court argues that since the power to penalise the parent for the conduct of the daughter 
has no bearing on the legality of a decision addressed only to the offending company, there is 
a choice to penalise either the infringer and/or its parent.103 This must be taken to mean that 
the mere fact that an authority did not impute liabi ty to a parent company for a subsidiary’s 
action in a previous decision does not require the same assessment to be made in a subsequent 
case, and vice-versa.104  
 
The principle that agencies are not bound to follow a particular exercise of discretion is 
equally applicable to the level of fines imposed. In regard to the EC, and despite initial 
indications that it could not in principle depart in a particular case from the criteria stated 
earlier in calculating fines,105 it is now settled case law that it retains large margin in setting 
fines, as well as the relevant aggravating and mitigat ng circumstances,106 and is not bound by 
its own past decisions.107 Thus, a legitimate expectation cannot be based on a method of 
calculating fines in the competition law domain.108 
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Although the Court entitles authorities to rely on parental liability as they see fit from one 
case to another, there are some caveats to it.  
 
Primo, the obligation to state reasons regarding the setting of a fine imposed on account of 
parental liability is very important, as we will detail below. Also, although the reasons for a 
decision that squares with a line of consistent practice may be given in summary, an explicit 
account must be provided if a decision goes appreciably further than previous ones.109  
 
Secundo, once competition authorities select the method for calculating fines in a given case, 
the same method should be affirmed to all participating undertakings.110 
 
Tertio, despite the flexibility that is hereby awarded, competition authorities have a great deal 
of interest in making use of the presumption where it proves available, because neither EU 
rule or principle provide that, if the addressee of a fine lacks liquidity, its parent is required to 
pay instead.111 This is why, when an infringing subsidiary is insolvent, it is worthwhile 
making the parent liable, with or without the subsidiary112. However, imposition of parental 
liability is not dependent on the demonstration of its need to ensure effective application of 
competition law in a particular instance.113 
 
If indeed competition agencies resort to the liabilty presumption, parent companies will be 
faced with an assumption – a ‘simple’ or ‘rebuttable’ presumption – that they actually exerted 
a decisive influence over their subsidiaries and, for that reason, may be held responsible for 
an infringement.  
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In that situation, competition authorities are not required to corroborate, by means of 
additional elements, the presumption, nor what it stands for, but instead it is for the party 
wishing to reverse the presumption to bear the hurdle of adducing sufficient evidence capable 
of showing that the subsidiary is independent.114 
 
To debunk the presumption, general assertions are not sufficient. It must be demonstrated, by 
means of fact and law, either that the parent company was not in a position to exert decisive 
influence or that the subsidiary was autonomous, i.e. that the parent, although being in a 
position to exert influence, did not actually exert it.115  
 
Therefore, at least in theory, the proof of the subsidiary’s autonomous conduct on the market 
should suffice to refute the presumption.116 The problem, as we will see, is that the 
evidentiary standard is set so high that it seems unreachable.  
 
In any case, parents are under no obligation to demonstrate that they did not interfere in the 
management of the subsidiary, but solely to show that t e subsidiary acted independently on 
the market.117 Otherwise, given the difficulty to demonstrate negative facts, the presumption 
would amount to a probatio diabolica.118  
 
The Court was ingenious in reconciling this doctrine with the presumption of innocence. It 
holds that the presumption does not lead to a reversal of the burden of proof, but lays down 
the standard of proof which must be satisfied when determining whether liability is to be 
attributed to a parent company.119 
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Given its refutable nature, the presumption should not lead to an automatism in attributing 
liability to a parent company, which would go against the principle of personal liability.120 
However, in practice, if a party does not challenge th  presumption, its application and the 
consequent liability will become automatic.  
 
As in the case of other rebuttable presumptions, if a fact can be lawfully presumed, it is 
considered to be established if the party concerned does not overturn the presumption by 
adducing conclusive evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, failure on the part of a parent to 
dispute the liability presumption, or to provide sufficient evidence that the subsidiary was 
autonomous, amounts to confirmation of the effectiv exercise of control and provides a 
sufficient basis for the imputation of liability and consequent joint and several responsibility 
for the payment of the fine imposed on the subsidiary.121 
 
4.2.2 Effective exercise of decisive influence 
 
We noticed earlier that in general it is incumbent upon competition agencies seeking to rely 
on parental liability, to demonstrate that decisive influence by a company over another was 
exercised and to borne out that contention on the basis of evidence.122 
 
When authorities are unable to rest on the presumption, hey will have to turn to indicia 
capable of inducing the said belief. Such indicia are lso instrumental to parent companies 
wishing to reverse the presumption. In both situations, liability is not vested by share 
ownership but legal and economic links.  
 
The type of evidence that is apt to discern whether a parent and a daughter constitute an 
undertaking is not fettered to the subsidiary’s commercial policy in the strict sense, i.e. its 
conduct on the market, and it is this boundless parameter that makes parental liability appear 
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inevitable.123 As some critics point out, an undertaking is an undertaking and it is intrinsic in 
its very concept that a parent has the ultimate power to exercise some form of influence over a 
subsidiary.124 
 
Several factors relating to a subsidiary’s policy in the narrow sense have been considered to 
determine whether a parent and a subsidiary form a single group, notably the parent’s 
influence on its subsidiary’s, v.g. pricing policy,125 production and distribution activities,126 
sales objectives, gross margins, sales costs, cash flow, stocks and marketing,127 codes of 
conduct,128 intra-group sales,129 insurance policies,130 human resources, sources of financing 
and computer systems,131 head-offices132 and employment contracts.133  
 
However, these are not the only relevant factors.  
 
Quite to the contrary, it follows from case law that, first, the subsidiary’s autonomy cannot be 
established by alleging that the parent was not active in the infringement or encourage the 
illegal behaviour upon its subsidiary, or that it was not aware of it. The fact that the subsidiary 
or its employees have disobeyed instructions from the parent, in particular by concealing the 
unlawful behaviour, does not seem to undermine the foregoing conclusion.134  
 
Secondly, due to the concept of undertaking, attribution of an infringement to a parent 
company does not require proof that it influences its subsidiary’s conduct in the specific 
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market on which the infringement occurred.135 However, it has been alleged that when a 
parent company and a subsidiary are active on the same cartelised market, or on closely 
related markets, it is hardly conceivable that each of them would conduct its policy on own 
motion.136 It was also argued that the premise that two sister companies are active on the same 
market is not such as to call into question the finding that they belong to the same group.137  
 
Therefore, the subsidiary’s independence is assessed on a wide basis, i.e. orientations as to its 
general commercial strategy and operations, taking account of all the relevant factors 
concerning the organisational, economic and legal links tying the parent to the subsidiary, 
which vary from case to case.138  
 
Many factors have been deployed with a view to either establish or deny the existence of an 
effective influence by a parent over a subsidiary. Investigating these facts implies competition 




The exercise of decisive influence by a parent is confirmed where facts show that the 
subsidiary is not autonomous in its behaviour on the market.139 Parents and subsidiaries in this 
situation are normally referred to as ‘de facto groups’.140 
 
AG Kokott observed in Akzo141 that, even if the examination of the autonomy of a subsidiary 
is carried out in the light of its commercial policy in the narrower sense, in the end the 
decisive factor is whether the parent, by reason of the intensity of its influence, can direct the 
conduct of its subsidiary to such an extent that the two must be regarded as one economic 
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unit. She even went on to suggest that a parent may still exercise decisive influence when it 
refrains from intervening at all: “a company’s mere membership of a group may influence its 
market conduct.” 
 
This approach was followed at length in later cases, where it became notorious that the idea of 
decisive influence was steadily replaced by that of organisational and economical links.142 
 
Therefore, the main goal of the test of decisive influence is to determine whether a company 
has put in place mechanisms which, considered together, enable it to keep track of the 
activities of its subsidiary and exert effective contr l and influence over its commercial policy 
and conduct. If this is the case, then the commercial policies of both companies will be 
intertwined (‘business links’). 
 
It is also necessary to take account of elements which make it possible to establish the 
existence of strong hierarchical links between the wo companies, such as reporting 
mechanisms and the crossover of board members143 (‘personal links’).  
 
The actual exercise of management power by a parent company over its subsidiary may be 
inferred from the implementation of the applicable statutory provisions or from a shareholders 
agreement.144 But what typically reveals the existence of organic and functional links is the 
fact that members of the decision-making bodies of the subsidiary are appointed by the 
parent.145  
 
According to case law, the representation of the parent in the management bodies of its 
subsidiary constitutes relevant, though not decisive,146 evidence that it exercises effective 
control.147  
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If a subsidiary’s management body is comprised onlyf appointees of its parent, this has been 
regarded as sufficient in itself to prove decisive nfluence.148 Although the Court has also 
found that appointing a board member does not equat to determining a subsidiary’s conduct 
even if the appointed individual holds a similar post with the parent,149 significance is 
normally attached to the presence of the parent in the management bodies of the subsidiary, 
albeit not substantial.150 Nor is it crucial for there to be interlocking directors between the 
management bodies of the two companies.151 The same holds for the nationality and 
geographical location of the subsidiary’s directors,152 the fact they exercise in parallel similar 
functions in other companies,153 and actually the level of responsibility of the personnel 
engaged in the offence.154 A parent company can either rely on the malfunctioing of its 
internal organisation to evade liability.155 
 
Reliance has also been placed on the fact that a parent company has the power to renew the 
board of the subsidiary and chooses deliberately not to do so.156 In other occasions though, the 
fact that the former members of the board remain in office has been understood as meaning 
that the parent had no influence on its subsidiary.157  
 
Normally, when a parent company appoints representatives to the management bodies of a 
subsidiary this means the parent plays a significant role in essential aspects of the strategy of 
its subsidiary. In particular, it allows the parent to be informed of the decisions and influence 
them.158 That preeminent role usually also entails reserving to the parent a power of final 
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decision with respect to a range of matters that define the subsidiary’s course of conduct on 
the market.159 Investment decisions,160 the budget161 and the business and operating plans162 
are particularly key evidence, even if the parent’s power is confined to making amendments 
and suggestions163 or if it may only intervene afterwards.164  
 
Compliance programmes may also turn against undertakings, since the engagement of parents 
in such programmes proves they believe to have the necessary means to require their 
subsidiaries to conduct themselves in accordance with competition rules.165 This circumstance 
is aggravated if the parent is a publicly listed company in the securities market.166 
 
In all these situations, it is inferred from the lack of reaction by the parent company that it is 
being punished for ‘some sort of negligent oversight’ 167 and is deemed to tacitly approve the 
unlawful conduct168. In any event, in General Química the CJ set aside in part the ruling of 
the GC for holding that an order given by a parent to a subsidiary to cease any practice which 





In a few instances the EC has attributed importance to the consolidation of the financial 
results of a subsidiary with those of the parent.170 However, parent companies are usually 
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required to consolidate the accounts of their group,171 so this circumstance is irrelevant to 
demonstrate effective influence.172  
 
Another factor that in principle has no implication  the autonomy of a subsidiary, because it 
is purely quantitative data, is the insignificance of its turnover or activities within the 
group.173  
 
In relation to this proposition, parent companies occasionally try to free themselves from 
liability by declaring their lack of interest in the offending subsidiary, which is sometimes 
demonstrated by the will to dispose of it. Credibility of these attempts has been challenged on 
the grounds that they do not imply that the parent is not interested in exercising decisive 
influence over the subsidiary during the period necessary to find a prospective buyer.174    
 
The absence of a formal and instituted system of reporting and information exchange between 
a parent and a subsidiary is also likely to be neutral.175 As the EC appositely states, entrusting 
individuals with concurrent positions in parent companies and subsidiaries constitutes a 
classic mechanism to keep information flow and coherence within the group,176 so the best 
direct link in a vertical relationship comes from the presence of the parent in the subsidiary’s 
managing bodies. 
 
One factor that has sometimes been relevant has to do with the perception of the group image. 
When a subsidiary uses a group name or brand in the market, or is perceived by third parties 
as being part of a group, that has worked as indicia of the existence of a sole undertaking.177 
However, this exact argument was also considered insuff cient to establish the subsidiary’s 
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autonomy178 and even irrelevant, since it relates only to the external relations of a subsidiary 
and not to the internal structure of the group’s organisation.179 Conversely, the fact that the 
parent and the subsidiary themselves considered the latter not to be an autonomous entity is a 
good indicator.180 
 
On top of these trifling factors, there are at least three major types of irrelevant factors that are 
worthwhile a closer exam. 
 
The EC has stated that the legal responsibility of the management of a company does not 
necessarily coincide with the business reality.181 This reasoning was on occasion taken to 
extreme consequences by holding that the obligations imposed on parent companies towards 
their subsidiaries as a result of national law seem to be irrelevant to assess control.182  
 
Attributing relevance to national law in the context of parental liability does not hinder the 
principle that companies may not rely on those provisi ns to shield themselves from 
responsibility.183 Resort to national rules should not relieve companies of the obligation to 
respect EU law under the principle of primacy. However, it is precisely with a view to make a 
correct application of this EU doctrine that national law should be taken into account.  
 
It is crucial to keep in mind that the functioning of companies and the composition and 
mission of their managing bodies are largely influenced by considerations of national law. A 
vast majority of the indicia used to assert parental liability is based on the role played by the 
managing bodies of subsidiaries and their parents. This implies a given conception about 
companies’ governing bodies and their importance, which is logically inspired by national 
law. Ignoring this reality is to deny the legal subtance of the problem. The inconsistency is 
all the more blatant because the genesis of EU parental liability lies in the legal orders of 
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Member States184 and, still today, it is not unprecedented to see the EC falling back on 
national law when it intends to support a finding of parental liability.185 
 
An additional factor that is typically disregarded concerns the daily management of a 
subsidiary. 
 
Since every incorporated company has a management board,186 the fact that a subsidiary has a 
dedicated local management and its own resources do n t prove that that company decides 
upon its conduct in the market independently.187 
 
It is indeed only normal that a parent company, having set up or bought a subsidiary, does not 
remain involved in the daily management of that company. As a result, entrusting the day-to-
day business of a subsidiary to its local management and officers is a common practice and is 
not a decisive factor when deciding to impute liabity to the parent, nor is it capable of 
reversing the presumption.188 The same is true if parent companies are active in a number of 
countries.189 
 
A slight variation of this debate concerns the so-called ‘purely financial holding companies’.  
 
The notion of holding company covers various situatons but, generally speaking, can be 
defined as an entity that has shareholdings in one or more companies with a view to manage 
such participations.190 So technically, holding companies normally have only a financial 
scope of business and do not exercise on their own any industrial or commercial activity. The 
sensitive issue is to determine whether those companies have a purely financial interest in 
their subsidiaries or if they act as ‘corporate centres’ for the group.  
                                                 
184 ICI p. 632; Commercial Solvents p. 229. 
185 FLS Plast 54-5. Cartonboard 142; 2003 Electrical and mechanical carbon 259; 2005 Industrial bags 721-2. 
186 GC Akzo 84. 
187 2010 AOI 222; Transcatab 106. 
188 2005 Tobacco Italy 338; Elevators and Escalators 623. 
189 9.9.2011 AOI 130. 
190 Schunk 60-2. 
 35
 
To escape parental liability financial companies must qualify as investment vehicles, which 
serve merely to invest capital in companies whose commercial operations they then leave to 
those companies, withdrawing capital as soon as other investments provide a better return.191 
It also helps to satisfy this qualification if the subsidiary that committed the infringement 
concentrates, on a self-sufficient basis, all the business of the group that relates to the sector 
where the infraction occurred.192 Curiously, this is an area within parental liability where the 
EC concedes making a parallel to the field of merger control.193 
 
If these conditions are met, those companies may be deemed as financial intermediates with 
no links to the operational businesses of their groups. Owing to the purely financial nature of 
their interests, it is believed such holdings are not i  a position to exercise influence over the 
conduct of their subsidiaries and are thus absolved from liability.194  
 
Further downstream, there are holding companies that are not a form of investment195 and 
that, irrespective of having a corporate object limited to the investment and management of 
shareholdings in other companies, may still exert dcisive influence over their subsidiaries 
going beyond the simple placing of capital.  
 
Therefore, it is not the corporate object of a company but rather its functional role that 
counts.196 The fact that holding companies do not carry on any commercial activity may even 
serve to confirm that they do not constitute autonomous players.197  
 
Thus, if a holding company does not operate as a pure financial vehicle, its task will typically 
be to consolidate shareholdings in various companies and directly or indirectly ensure they 
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are run as one.198 Supposedly where a parent company plays a coordinating role between its 
various subsidiaries and they share an objective (that may be as general as maximising 
profits), the subsidiaries cannot be considered autonomous.199 
 
Even equity funds may be liable for fines levied on their portfolio companies,200 and we see 
no reason, contrary to Gosselin, why this logic should not extend to foundations whose 
function is to ensure the unity of management of a subsidiary, even if they carry no 
commercial activity of their own.201 These entities could only escape being penalised if they 
lack legal personality. 
 
In addition, parental liability does not require that the parent’s business overlaps or is closely 
connected with that of its subsidiaries. Internal alloc tion of activities between different 
companies and divisions is a normal phenomenon within vertically-integrated groups, which 
is not enough to challenge the existence of a single undertaking.202 
 
Finally, an argument that appears regularly before the Court, mostly driven by the EC, is the 
idea that when a parent company and a subsidiary ‘speak with one voice’ during an 
infringement procedure, this should bear consequences. 
 
Based on existing precedents, it is possible to break down as follows the events capable of 
culminating in unity of action in this sense: (i) joint responses to requests for information or 
the SO; (ii)  spontaneous reactions to requests addressed to the other party; (iii)  submission of 
a leniency application on behalf of the entire group; and (iv) shared counsel representation. 
 
The Court and the EC have been hesitating on the significance to be derived from the fact that 
a parent and a subsidiary act jointly at some stage in the proceedings. This circumstance has 
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amounted to important evidence of effective influence,203 but was also deemed insufficient204 
or even “entirely irrelevant”205 and “superfluous” 206 to that end. 
 
The position that for us tends to be more just is to consider that the fact that a parent and a 
subsidiary present themselves as a sole interlocutor onstitutes a clue that they are part of the 
same undertaking.207 The fact that the two share or concentrate sensitive information is a valid 
indicator in our view. Nevertheless, the exact degre  of appreciation granted to this fact 
should be modulated by the extent of the joint action of the parties throughout the procedure. 
If the parent and the subsidiary coordinate their actions only in a few diligences, this is likely 
to constitute a weak sign of the existence of a single economic unity, which must be 
corroborated by other evidence.208 
 
4.2.3 Dual basis approach 
 
2007’s Akzo made it clear that full or quasi-full ownership of a subsidiary is alone and in itself 
sufficient to support a parental liability presumption. Prior to that point in time, it was the 
EC’s strategy to make careful use of the presumption and support its findings of liability for 
parent companies on a dual basis: inferring group liability from a share capital viewpoint 
when applicable and establishing decisive influence on the basis of a series of elements of 
fact.209 
 
This twofold approach is the pragmatic solution set up by the EC in order to overcome 
uncertainties or potential shortcomings arising from the use of the presumption on a stand 
alone basis (‘prudent evidence’210).  
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This method goes beyond what is required by case law in full or quasi-full ownership 
situations because it implies waiving reliance solely on the presumption. Here, parent 
companies may only be held liable where there is evidence to support decisive influence. 
 
For this reason, the Court goes on to find that, in choosing that method, competition 
authorities raise the standard of proof of the actul exercise of decisive influence and make it 
more onerous than that which would have been regardd as sufficient.211 As an immediate 
consequence of this, the principle of equal treatmen  r quires that, where the dual basis 
method is adopted in a particular case, that same criteria must be relied on for all undertakings 
involved.212  
 
In the AOI judgments, the Court annulled the Tobacco Spain cartel decision precisely because 
the EC applied the dual basis to all parent companies, with the exception of one, in respect to 
which liability was attributed solely on the basis of the presumption.213 
 
Having said that, it is however apparent that this line of reasoning was not always followed 
consistently. At least in two occasions the Court ‘authorised’ the EC to use different standards 
of review in respect to distinct undertakings in the same exact case.214 
 
The increased standard of proof entailed in the dual basis approach should not mean in our 
opinion that competition authorities will lose the ability they have to rely on parental liability, 
or not, from one case to another. That approach should be mandatory only in the comparative 
treatment of undertakings within a particular case; it does not create any obligation or 
expectation for future cases. The EC seems to share t is point of view.215 
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The dual basis approach has essentially an historical background, associated to initial doubts 
as to whether the presumption could alone bring into play parental liability in total or near 
total ownership cases. Now that those doubts have vnished, this approach reflects a best 
practice, but there should be theoretically no interest for competition authorities to use it in 
modern cases, unless there are strong elements of fact and law upholding the presumption.  
 
Probably to deal with this, the Court has put up the cryptic idea that it does not really matter 
what is complementarily invoked when a company owns all or virtually all the shares of 
another. Since in such cases the parent and the subsidiary may be liable just for reason of their 
shareholding links, the Court concludes therefrom that, even if the indicia relied on to support 
that is factually wrong or incapable or insufficient to substantiate decisive influence, still there 
is no ground for holding illegal the imputation of the subsidiary’s infringement to the parent 
and it is irrelevant to examine any purported contradictions or mistakes incurred by the EC.216 
 
We have great trouble understanding this case law. If a competition authority chooses to 
adopt a dual basis method in a particular case, this means, by definition, that it made the use 
of the presumption subject to the production of additional indicia. In this circumstance, the 
presumption and factual evidence work hand in hand,  the former cannot uphold a liability 
finding if it is unsupported by accurate and cogent fac s.  
 
4.3 Adequate statement of reasons 
 
This section is principally focused on the actions f EU institutions within the framework of 
Article 296, § 2 TFEU.  
 
The obligation to state the reasons regarding the setting of a fine is particularly important.217 
Whilst in general legal incorporation is not relevant in competition law, and is in fact 
underestimated by the notion of undertaking, when reasoning and collecting penalties are at 
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stake, the entity to which a decision is addressed must possess legal or natural personality so 
that if needed enforcement proceedings can be taken pursuant to Article 299 TFEU.218  
 
Accordingly, an infringement of EU competition law must be imputed unequivocally to a 
person and, when the SO and the final decision are se ved, they must be addressed to that 
person and indicate in which capacity he is called on to answer for the unlawful behaviour.219 
 
Where an antitrust decision relates to a plurality of addressees it must include an adequate 
statement of reasons with respect to each of the addressees, in particular those of them who 
bear liability for the infringement.220  
 
In parental liability, these requirements translate into the need, first, for the parent to be 
included, along with the subsidiary, among the addressees of the SO and the decision, each 
taken separately and individually.221 The fact that the parent is aware of the SO or the 
decision addressed to its subsidiary does not ensur observance with the parent’s rights of 
defence and does not allow it to answer the charges lev lled against it.222  
 
In order to contain suitable reasoning in regard to a parent company, the SO and the decision 
must also embrace a detailed explanation for imputing he infringement to it.223 It must be 
clear that the parent is being declared jointly and severally liable for payment of a fine 
imposed on the subsidiary, and the reasons (presumption of decisive influence, evidence of 
influence or a combination of both) why a finding of liability is made against it and why fines 
are imposed.224 
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This is an essential feature of companies’ rights of defence and a key procedural 
requirement.225 Even though the presumption is enough to sustain prental liability, if no 
express reference is made to it, this equates to violating the duty to state reasons.226 The same 
happens if no satisfactory explanation is given as to why the potential arguments adduced to 
rebut the presumption fail to reach that purpose.227 Important cartel decisions have been 
annulled because of this.228 
 
In any event, this requirement needs to be reconciled with other lines of case law.  
 
First, competition authorities, in particular the EC, have no obligation to address investigative 
measures, v.g. information requests or on site inspections, to both the parent and the 
subsidiary.229 Similarly, in situations in which parental liability lies solely on the presumption, 
it is not necessary to submit evidence other than proof relating to the shareholding of a parent 
in its subsidiary.230 
 
Secondly, competition authorities, in particular the EC, are not obliged to take position on all 
the arguments relied on by the parties and it is sufficient if they set out the facts and the legal 
considerations having decisive importance in the case.231  
 
In the Court’s eyes, the EC is not required to devis  its standing on arguments which are 
manifestly irrelevant or insignificant or plainly of secondary importance to assert if a parent 
and a subsidiary constitute a single undertaking.232 In situations of full and quasi-full 
ownership, it looks as if a general standing, according to which the presumption is sufficient 
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to impute liability to a parent company and the arguments essayed to the contrary do not go to 
the presumption, meets with the applicable test.233 
 
On the one occasion in which the Court considered such a generic assertion as insufficient 
grounds for reasoning it was because the contested decision concerned the MCAA cartel, 
which was one of the first cases where the EC relied fully and solely on the presumption to 
support parental liability.234 Apart from this episode, there is apparently only a need to take a 
position on contrary arguments that are significant to assess a subsidiary’s independence.235 
 
4.4 Allocation of liability  
 
If an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is e tablished, liability may be imputed to 
the parent company of a group, to the subsidiary responsible for the infringement or jointly 
and severally to both.236 
 
However, the fact that a parent is responsible for the conduct of a subsidiary does not mean 
that it is regarded as having carried out that conduct, nor in any way exonerates the subsidiary 
of its own responsibility. The subsidiary remains individually accountable for the 
anticompetitive practices in which it took part237 and responsibility on the part of the parent is 
additional.238  
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4.4.1 Allocation within the group 
 
The presumption of parental liability applies not only in the case where there is a direct 
relationship between a parent and a subsidiary, but also where that relationship is indirect due 
to the interposition of an intermediary company.239 
 
It follows that in the specific case where a company holds all, or almost all, the capital of an 
interposed company which, in turn, holds all the capital (or close to it) of a subsidiary, there is 
a rebuttable presumption that the top company exercises decisive influence over the 
interposed company and, via this company, over the last subsidiary. Consequently, the 
ultimate parent company may be liable for the conduct of the offending subsidiary, unless it 
demonstrates that either the interposed company or the subsidiary operate independently in 
the market.240 
 
Since the liability presumption applies to top and i termediate companies, this is true a 
fortiori  when decisive influence is demonstrated to have actually occurred by means of 
factual evidence, regardless of the percentage of capital held by the final and interposed 
companies. Therefore, a company may be held liable for the sins of its subsidiary, whose 
capital it does not hold directly, in so far as that company exercises decisive influence over 
the said subsidiary, even indirectly. In such a situat on, the holding company, the interposed 
company and the last subsidiary constitute a single undertaking.241  
 
These considerations are equally applicable if the ‘grandparent’, i.e. the head of the group, is a 
natural person242 or a combination of several persons, natural or legal.243 It matters little in 
this context if trustees come into play in the group chain.244  
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Conversely, if the entity participating in the infri gement has neither natural nor legal 
personality, v.g. because it is an unincorporated business unit within a group, liability has to 
be directed against the top entity with legal personality of which that entity forms part.245  
 
In a situation where there are large numbers of operating companies participating in an 
infringement and belonging to the same group, the infringement may be imputed to the 
company at the head of the group.246 In the absence of a person to which liability could be 
assigned, the question arises as to whether the component companies may be liable for all the 
acts of the group. This calls upon the issue of the liability of ‘sister companies’.  
 
Admittedly, the simple fact that two companies are held by the same entity is insufficient to 
establish that they are an economic unit with the result that the actions of one company can be 
attributed to the other and that one can be liable to pay a fine covering the acts of the other.247  
 
In any event, imputation of liability to a sister company of the offender is possible as long as 
the parent company common to both has decided to entrust the former with the task of 
coordinating the group’s business or at least the part covered by the infringement.248 
Moreover, the Court is of the view that, where a company is supervised by a sister, it is 
legitimate to assume that it was the common parent that entrusted those supervisory powers to 
the affiliated company.249  
 
In this case, the liability presumption does not apply, since a sister company is not a 
subsidiary. For the same reason, this is neither a question of parental liability. However, under 
the referred conditions, a group company may, alone250 or with its parent,251 be held jointly 
and severally liable for the conduct of a sister company, although it is not its own subsidiary. 
                                                 
245 2011 Arkema France et al. 62. Bellamy & Child 104-5. 
246 PVC II 989; 2012 Shell 52. Bellodi 175. 
247 CJ Aristrain 99; Dansk 118. 
248 CJ Aristrain 96-101; Dansk 119-20; Jungbunzlauer 120, 125-9. Pre-Insulated Pipe 160. 
249 Nynäs et al. 52. 
250 HFB 66. 
251 CJ ArcelorMittal 104. Copper Plumbing 556. 
 45
 
The great benefit of this case law is that there is no need to establish the whole chain of 
responsibility within a group and to address the SO and the decision to all its companies.  
 
4.4.2 Succession issues 
 
The basic temporal rule is that liability is assigned to parent companies pro rata temporis, i.e. 
to the extent of their own involvement with the infr ging subsidiary. However, application of 
this rule may prove difficult in certain circumstances, and complex questions may arise as a 
result of structural changes in the control of an undertaking. The main problems and solutions 
are schematically presented along these lines. 
 
There is no express provision covering the issue of responsibility for a competition law 
infringement following corporate restructuring or acquisition. It would however be 
impermissible for undertakings to avoid liability because of a corporate reorganisation,252 so 
liability succession has been determined in the light of EU law principles.253  
 
As a rule, it falls to the natural or legal person managing a company when an infringement is 
committed to answer those charges, even if, when th decision finding the infringement was 
adopted, another person had assumed responsibility for operating the company in question.254  
 
When, between the commission of an infringement and the time when the undertaking at hand 
must answer for it, that undertaking goes through a corporate change, parental liability is 
allocated by means of a dual criterion: the ‘legal continuity test’ or the ‘economic continuity 
test’.255 
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Legal continuity test 
 
If the person managing the undertaking disposes of the company or assets which contributed 
to the infringement, he continues to be answerable for the infringement, provided he is still in 
existence at least until the final decision in the procedure256 and even if he has withdrawn in 
the meantime from the market in question.257  
 
On the back of this, responsibility for the period up to the divestment does not pass to the 
acquirer but remains with the first group.258 Hence, there is no case of an ‘innocent’ purchaser 
becoming fixed with liability solely by reason of having acquired an infringing 
undertaking.259 
 
Historically, there were a few circumstantial deviations from this rule, which is the expression 
of the principle of personal liability.260 However, we think the Court was able to ring fence 
those situations and keep the fundamentals of this principle, coupled with the notion of 
undertaking, at the core of its case law.  
 
In several cases the Court said the fact that the acquirer knows of the involvement of the 
target in an unlawful behaviour should concur to hold it liable for the past infringement of the 
subsidiary.261 However, the prevailing thesis is that the fact that an acquirer is aware, or could 
not have been unaware, that the acquired company partici ted in an infringement before its 
acquisition does not suffice to impute to it the unlawful conduct prior to the acquisition.262  
 
On a different instance the Court went on to consider that the EC was exceptionally entitled to 
impute to a purchaser liability for the unlawful conduct of the seller because the acquirer had 
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accepted liability for the seller’s actions prior t taking over the assets concerned.263 Again, it 
was clear that, in so far as such a situation constitutes an exception to the principle of 
individual liability, it would be interpreted strictly. Hence, the Court subsequently ruled that a 
contractual instrument cannot be relied upon in order to escape penalties incurred under EU 
law inasmuch as it seeks to apportion liability between companies.264 
 
Different conclusions are reached when a business is transferred from one company to 
another, in cases where transferor and transferee are connected by economic links, that is to 
say, when they belong to the same undertaking. Indeed, when an entity that has breached EU 
competition provisions is subject to an intragroup change, that change should not create a new 
undertaking free of liability for its predecessor’s infringements.265 
 
In such cases, liability for past behaviour of the ransferor may be passed on to the entity that 
succeeded it, notwithstanding the fact that the first remains in existence.266 Imposing a penalty 
for the infringement on the successor can thus not be excluded simply because it has a 
different legal form or name.267 The circumstance that the decision to transfer the rel vant 
activity or company is imposed by law is equally irrelevant.268  
 
There were nonetheless two occasions in which the Court did not follow this approach. In the 
PVC II case, the GC held, without being contradicted by the CJ, that “the transfer of the 
branch of business activity [accountable for the breach] to subsidiaries has no impact on the 
determination of the undertaking responsible for the infringement”.269 On a second occasion, 
the Court addressed those principles directly but intentionally opted for not relying on them 
because of the formalistic argument that the parent company of the group concerned was not 
held liable for the infringement of its subsidiaries, and for this reason, and also in the absence 
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of evidence that this was a strategy to avoid penalties, the transferee could not be imputed 
with liability which was not previously established.270  
 
Based on this line of reasoning, some doctrine sustains that liability may also fall to the 
successor if the succession is a proven attempt to circumvent liability.271  
 
Alternatively, if the acquired subsidiary carries on the infraction after its acquisition, liability 
for the infringement is apportioned between the seller and the acquirer (if parental liability 
can be established in both cases), each undertaking be  responsible for the respective period 
in which the subsidiary participated in the unlawful conduct.272 The fact that the new parent 
only held control over the subsidiary in the final stage of the infringement does not exclude its 
liability.273 However, the mere fact that an employee which participated in an infringement is 
seconded to another company does not imply that the latt r automatically becomes an 
infringer.274 
 
Economic continuity test 
 
When the person that was in charge of the infringing u dertaking prior to its disposal ceased 
to exist in the interim, it is necessary to find the combination of physical and human elements 
which contributed to the commission of the infringement (‘legal package’275) and to identify 
the person who has become responsible for their operation.276  
 
It has been considered that the disappearance of the person previously in charge of the 
offending undertaking brings under the same wing situations in which it has ceased to exist at 
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law or economically,277 given that a penalty imposed on a company that continues to exist in 
law but has ceased economic activity or is incapable of paying the fine is likely to have no 
deterrent effect. 
  
If the initial parent company simply disappeared, the acquirer of the ‘legal package’ will 
answer for the whole period of the infringement.278 It is for competition agencies to prove that 
on the date the decision is adopted there is no legal person to whom the offending conduct of 
the subsidiary prior to acquisition could be imputed.279 
 
If the parent ceased to exist but has been merged with, or absorbed by, another entity, the 
latter will remain liable for the past infringement, even if the ‘legal package’ was transferred 
to third parties.280  
 
In both situations, the acquirer assumes the rights and obligations of the dissolved entity and 
is treated as its economic successor.281 Unlike internal restructurings, where there are two 
successive legal forms of one and the same undertaking that simply changed name or form 
but continued to exist with its economic and functional characteristics essentially unchanged, 
in that case the acquirer is only liable for past behaviours because there is obvious economic 
continuity between two distinct undertakings. There being no legal, economic continuity is 
considered necessary for the acts of the former undertaking to be imputed to the new one. 
 
Some case law is dubious as to whether the economic continuity test should be triggered by 
the disappearance of the initial parent company or of the infringing subsidiary. Certain 
judgments even suggest that it should be the latter.282 In our view, the status of the subsidiary 
is irrelevant for this purpose. If a subsidiary no longer exists after its acquisition, merger or 
absorption, the former parent continues to be liable for the infringement prior to that event, as 
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long as the parent itself continues in existence.283 What matters for the application of the 
economic continuity test is the disappearance, on the date of a decision, of the parent 
company responsible for the operation of the subsidiary during the infringement. It can only 
be different if the entity that participated in the infringement did not form an undertaking with 
its parent or did not belong to a vertically integrated group, but acted on its own right.284  
 
In sum, when a company or activity is transferred, r sponsibility for an antitrust infringement 
normally rests with the transferring entity. There can be assignment of past responsibility only 
in exceptional circumstances, e.g. if the transferor ceased to exist after the infringement or if 
the transferor and the transferee belong to the same group. 
 
In any case, the subsidiary that committed the violati n continues to bear responsibility for its 
actions prior to acquisition.285 As is the case with group relationships where competition 
authorities may choose to penalise the subsidiary or the parent, that choice is also available in 
liability succession.286 That being the case, it is possible to impute the subsidiary’s conduct to 
the former parent company, alone or jointly with the subsidiary or with the new parent 
company if admissible. By contrast, given the personal nature of infringements, the purchaser 
may only be liable in the limited circumstances mentioned above.  
 
Anyhow, it does not seem incompatible with this principle to impute responsibility only to the 
subsidiary even if that means, because it was in between acquired by a third party, that the 
financial consequences of the penalty end up being borne by the purchaser, who is 
unconnected with the infringement.287 
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4.5 Specificities in setting fines 
 
This section is particularly focused on the legal criteria followed by the EC in applying 
Regulation 1/2003, although European competition authorities usually follow closely the 
EC’s practice when applying fines in procedures involving Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
4.5.1 General remarks  
 
According to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, undertakings infringing Articles 101 and 
102 are exposed to hefty fines up to 10% of their total turnover in the last business year. 
When several companies are jointly and severally liable for a fine on the grounds that they 
form a single undertaking, that will have a huge impact on the amount of the fine.  
 
The most direct result of this is that the 10% ceiling does not apply to the individual turnover 
of each of the companies involved in the offence, rather it is calculated on the basis of the 
worldwide turnover of the undertaking concerned, i.e. of all its constituent parts taken 
together.288 The reason behind this is that the overall turnover of an undertaking gives an 
indication of the size and economic power of the entity in question and the influence it is able 
to exert in the market.289  
 
Therefore, the criteria for assessing the gravity of an infringement may encompass, apart from 
the volume and value of the goods and services in respect of which the infringement was 
committed, the size and power of an undertaking.290 A fine merely reflecting the market share 
of an undertaking could fail to consider the real strength of the group, especially when the 
offender operates under the influence of a parent company.291 
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The turnover to be taken into consideration when calcul ting the 10% ceiling is that of the 
group as a whole, including the companies that are not implicated in the violation.292 It has 
even been considered that intra-group sales should be included for these purposes,293 which 
clearly seems excessive given that the proceeds of internal transactions are unrelated to the 
market value and economic weight of an undertaking.  
 
As far as an infringement is the object of collective liability, it is necessary to consider how 




Where an infraction involves several undertakings and there is considerable disparity between 
their comparative sizes, differential treatment may be applied in order to take account of the 
actual economic ability of undertakings to cause significant damage to competitors and to set 
the fine at a level which ensures that it has a sufficiently deterrent effect.295 
 
If this would not be the case, it would be open to a large undertaking to escape from fines by 
creating subsidiaries with little turnover to engage them in illegal behaviour. Imposing a 
sufficiently high fine on a large undertaking is likely to deter that behaviour. To the extent 
consistent with this purpose, large undertakings are in a different situation from smaller ones, 
in that a difference of treatment appears objectively justified.296  
 
To this end, the EC is authorised to apply a ‘multiplier’ based on the overall turnover of an 
undertakings when its dimension and global resources ar  such that, unless the amount of the 
fine is adjusted this would not have a deterrent effect, as it would be too low a fraction of the 
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turnover.297 It is also considered that, due to their legal and economic knowledge and 
infrastructures, undertakings in this situation are more easily able to raise the necessary funds 
to pay the fine298 and to acknowledge the illegality and results of their behaviour.299 
 
It follows that, in parental liability cases the global turnover of an undertaking is a crucial 
element to be factored into the maximum amount and the ‘deterrence multiplier’ of a fine.300 
 
If reliance is placed on the turnover of an undertaking, several theories have been followed to 
determine the appropriate period to reflect its true size and power or the scale of the 
infringement it committed.301 Despite the method which is followed to determine the power of 
an undertaking and the deterrence factor, it needs to be applied consistently to all 
undertakings participating in an infringement,302 including within the same group,303 and the 
turnovers resulting thereof must adequately reflect the economic reality and capacity it seeks 
to capture.304  
 
As to the 10% ceiling, since it aims inter alia to shield undertakings against excessive 
fines,305 it must refer to the overall turnover of the undertaking concerned in the financial year 
immediately preceding the decision.306 
 
And can the fine imposed on the parent jointly and severally with the subsidiary be heavier or 
lighter than that levied on the latter? In principle, no; both companies should be liable for the 
same amount, subject only to any aggravating or mitigat ng circumstances that may apply in 
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respect to just one of the parties307 and the fact that, because of a succession incident, a parent 
company should be responsible only for part of the infringement.308 
 
Another aggravating factor that may be relevant hereunder is the omission of information or 
the provision of incorrect or misleading information as to the links between the companies of 
a group with a view to evade parental liability or render its detection more difficult.309 
 
Recidivism is also an important factor.310 There is however a subtle distinction between the 
consequences and the findings of repeated infringements.  
 
Because of the principle of individual liability, if a company belonged to several undertakings 
and only some of these are repeated offenders, they are the only ones liable for a recidivist 
penalty, imposed as a separate fine.311 Yet, due to the notion of undertaking, it is possible to 
find recidivism when two different companies belonging to the same group are censured for 
the same type of infringement on different occasion,312 provided that interplay between those 




The relevance of attenuating circumstances specific to parental liability is limited; e.g. the fact 
that a parent company did not participate in the infringement perpetrated by the subsidiary,314 
was not aware of it,315 displayed negligence in controlling the latter,316 disposed of the 
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subsidiary at a later stage,317 has left the market concerned318 or mobilised no resources to the 
infraction319 play no role in this context.  
 
As concerns leniency, the rule is that in the absence of an announced intention by the parent 
and the subsidiary to jointly cooperate in the procedure,320 the application, the submission of 
evidence, the contribution to the programme and the benefits thereof are individually assessed 
and ascribed in respect to each of the group companies.321 
 
Two final issues of utmost significance are the effects of the limitation period and of the 
annulment of decisions in parent-subsidiary relationships. 
 
In respect to the first issue, the Court attaches an erga omnes effect to the interruption of the 
limitation period, which applies not only to the sub idiary but also to its parent.322 As for the 
suspension of the limitation period, the EC developed a theory f ‘cross application’ of 
suspensive effects in parental liability, on the basis of which the submission of an appeal by a 
company would suspend the limitation period for all the group.323 The Court rejected this and 
held that the suspension produces only an inter partes effect so that the company which is a 
party to judicial proceedings is the only in respect of which the limitation period is suspended, 
even in cases of parental liability.324 
 
As regards the scope of the annulment of EC decisions, since the basic imperative is that the 
Court cannot rule ultra petita,325 an eventual pronounced annulment may not operate to he 
advantage of those who did not file an appeal.326 There is though an interesting twist of this 
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rule in parental liability cases. If the Court has before it actions for annulment filed separately 
by a parent and a subsidiary, it may take into account the outcome of the action brought by 
the subsidiary, if the form of order sought by the parent has the same object.327 
 
4.5.2 Succession of undertakings 
 
Whilst fines imposed on various companies belonging to a single group throughout the 
infringement are calculated on the basis of the economic power of that group, the rule in 
succession cases is that if an undertaking that committed an infringement is subsequently 
broken up or sold on, each addressee of the decision  entitled to have the 10% ceiling 
applied individually to it at the date of the decision.328  
 
Thus, if a company belonged to different undertakings successively, it is necessary to impose 
on that company a fine made up of two separate amounts for each of the periods 
corresponding to the time it belonged to the different undertakings, in order to determine in an 
appropriate manner the amounts to be paid by the several companies.329 
 
However, penalty allocation in succession cases has proved to be particularly sensitive for the 
EC. 
 
When a company acquires another and had not had the time to assume control of it between 
acquisition date and termination of the infringement, the EC should waive a fine on the 
parent.330  
 
Another interesting situation is that in Gosselin, where the GC annulled the Removals cartel 
decision. The GC treated this as if the parent “managed to rebut the presumption that it exerts 
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a decisive influence over [the subsidiary]”,331 but this was not really the case. The head of the 
group was a foundation with no economic activity, whose certificates were only issued and 
governing bodies only met for the first time after the infringement has ceased. Assuming that 
no other informal links existed to demonstrate decisive influence,332 this should be treated as a 
situation of succession of undertakings. 
 
In the Industrial Bags and Gas switchgear cartels, the EC was faced with complex succession 
issues and, for the sake of ease, took the view that it could freely arrange the amounts to be 
paid by the several entities. The GC rejected this po ition, stating that joint and several 
liability for payment of a fine can only cover the p riod of infringement during which a parent 
and a subsidiary form a sole undertaking. For the Court, it follows from the principles of legal 
certainty and individual liability that each company must be able to discern from the decision 
the period for which it is liable and the exact amount of the fine which it must pay in respect 
of that period.333 
 
In Areva the Court followed exactly the same dicta but remarked that, because companies are 
allowed to make a claim for recovery against co-debtors, they are able to determine this way 
their share of the fine.334 
 
In a case of successive parental liability, the amounts to be paid by the successive parents 
should, in so far as possible, reflect the weighting of their individual shares of liability.335 
However, those amounts do not need to be set in a manner which is strictly proportionate to 
the duration of the infringement.336 Although this might resemble difficult to reconcile with 
some existing case law,337 it is reasonable that fines imposed on various companies, accused 
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of participating in the infringement for different periods of time and in different 
circumstances, may not be mathematically equal to the duration of their involvement. 
 
Also, although the date on which the succession occurred can be easily traced, the concrete 
turnover taken into consideration in respect to each of the successive parents depends on the 
period the EC deems relevant for this purpose.338 
 
While it is only possible to consider the consolidated turnover of an undertaking if the parent 
exercised decisive influence over the subsidiary during the relevant period,339 there is nothing 
preventing a company which does not form an undertaking on the date the decision is adopted 
from being liable for past infringements.340  
 
Therefore, when an infringement is committed by a subsidiary which has belonged to various 
groups, the combined value of the fine ascribed to the parents may well be greater than that 
inflicted on the subsidiary,341 provided the 10% threshold is respected when the decision is 
issued.342 That can be the case, .g. if at the day the decision is adopted, the subsidiary 
belongs to a group that is smaller than that of onef its previous parents or is not even 
vertically-integrated343 or if it is the other way around.344  
 
4.6 Enforcement of joint and several holdings 
 
Areva and Siemens are the leading cases in this matter.345  
 
Here, the Court considered that where several persons are liable for an infringement, they 
must be so on a joint and several bases. Even though the nature of the payment obligation on 
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companies in that situation differs from that of joint debtors of a private-law obligation, the 
Court deemed it appropriate to seek guidance in the national rules on joint and several 
obligations. Hence, in the absence of an indication in the decision that certain companies are 
more responsible than others for the offence, it is assumed that the wrongdoing is attributed to 
each company in equal measure and each should contribute in equal amounts to the fine.  
 
Under this system, the EC is allowed discretion, as per Articles 291(1) and 299 TFEU, to call 
on all or part of the fine from one or other of the legal persons concerned until its right to 
recover is extinguished.346 Logically, the amount of the debt reduces on any pa ment by any 
party; there is no ‘double counting’.347 Similarly, payment of the full amount of the fine by
one company cancels the obligation on the others,348 without prejudice to the ability of the 
former to make a claim against its co-debtors to pursue recourse for the sums it might have 




It is now easy to understand just why it is so difficult to succeed in disproving a finding of 
parental liability. In total or near total ownership cases, competition authorities need to put 
forward neither argument nor evidence serving to found effective influence. Where such 
influence is demonstrated or corroborated by evidence, still it will be problematic to prove the 
autonomy of a subsidiary whose capital is largely in the hands of a single shareholder. Even 
in cases where subsidiaries admittedly enjoy great autonomy (“grande autonomie”) 349 or 
qualify as full-function joint ventures, that may not do to discharge parental liability.  
 
In a limited number of instances the Court annulled EC’s parental liability findings on the 
grounds of inconsistent or insufficient reasoning.  
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These concerned essentially: (i) erroneous application of the dual basis method;350 (ii)  
imputation of parental liability to a company holding 60% of the share capital of another 
without establishing to the requisite legal standard the actual exercise of control;351 (iii)  wrong 
allocation of liability among successive parent companies;352 (iv) holding a sister company 
liable for the actions of the offender without demonstrating the existence of managerial 
control over it;353 (v) failure to identify the presumption as the legal bsis for embracing the 
parent in liability;354 (vi) lack of adequate reasons explaining why the presumption should 
hold against opposing arguments;355 (vii) incorrect application of a penalty for ‘group 
recidivism’.356 
 
However, the errors committed by the EC in these cases were non recurrent methodological 
slips and do not contend with the substance of this doctrine. The EC itself acknowledged to 
have taken careful note of the Court’s warnings andextra steps to ensure that the reasons 
supporting parental liability are clearly spelled out.357 
 
AG Kokott identified in Akzo three scenarios which could be eligible for rebutting parental 
liability: the parent company behaves like a pure financial investor; the parent holds 100% of 
the shares in the subsidiary only temporarily; the parent is prevented for legal reasons from 
exercising its control.  
 
However, the only argument that was ever capable of toppling parental liability on its merits 
was the purely financial nature of a parent company.358 Oddly or not, this has happened just 
once and it was in a dual basis case, so the presumption rests undefeated.  
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Hope for a successful breakthrough in regard to financial investors is even less tenable, as 
parental liability can operate per saltum. If a head or intermediate group company is a purely 
financial holding, presumably it should be easy to replace it by a ‘suitable candidate’, 
recalling that group liability works almost as a fatality for modern organisations. 
 
The best exit solution is for companies to prepare beforehand. In most cases, since 
rearranging their groups is not an option, the most parent companies may do is to take an 
active interest in ensuring that a comprehensive compliance programme and sound 
governance policies are in place to prevent these contingencies. They must also carefully 
consider contractual arrangements when acquiring companies and assets. Otherwise, parents 
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